Abstract. We consider a persuasion game where multiple experts with potentially con ‡icting selfinterests attempt to persuade a decision-maker, say, a judge. The judge prefers to take an action that is most appropriate given the state of the world but the experts'preferences over the actions are independent of the state. The judge has no commitment power and takes her best action given the experts' reports. Experts have private types: an informed expert observes the state but an uninformed expert does not. An expert cannot lie but an informed expert may conceal information by feigning ignorance. We o¤er a general characterization of the equilibrium and highlight three key implications: …rst, in some cases, recruiting a better expert (i.e., one with higher likelihood of being informed) can make the judge worse o¤. Second, if the judge chooses the panel of experts, she always prefers experts with extreme preferences. Finally, the judge may prefer a panel of experts with identical (but extreme) rather than opposing preferences.
Introduction
Decision-makers often rely on the advice of the experts. However, if the experts are themselves interested in the decision, they may attempt to in ‡uence the decision-maker by withholding or …ltering information. To counteract such manipulation of information, decision-makers often solicit advice from experts with con ‡icting preference, the premise being that competition between the experts facilitates information revelation. For example, a judge may invite experts'testimony from both the plainti¤ and the defendant, a policy maker may listen to advocacy groups representing di¤erent interests, and a voter may listen to policy stands of di¤erent candidates.
While several authors have studied the issue of eliciting private information from competing experts (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Shin, 1994 Shin, , 1998 ; Gul and Pesendorfer, Emons and Fluet, 2009 ; Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011; Gentzkow and Kamenica, 2011) , the extant literature has little to say about the link between the extent of con ‡ict among the experts and the quality of decision-making. This article attempts to bridge this gap.
We consider an environment where the judge cannot commit to his actions and there is uncertainty over whether or not an expert possesses the relevant information. In this setting, we develop a simple model of competition for persuasion that allows us to explore certain key questions, such as: How does the con ‡ict of interest between experts in ‡uence the extent of information revelation? Does the quality of decision-making necessarily improve if the competing experts are more informed? Should policy advisors be chosen from those with moderate or those with extreme policy preferences ? We …nd that these questions have nuanced answers with important implications for the optimal design of expert panels. First, employing experts that are more likely to be informed may lead to worse decisions. Second, it is always optimal to use experts with extreme preferences. Moreover, it may be better for the decision-maker to employ experts who have similar interests rather than to promote competition by employing experts with opposing views.
We consider a persuasion game (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Glazer and Rubinstein, 2001 , 2006 with the following features. The decision-maker, or the "judge," wants to take an action matching the underlying "state", , and each agent A i , or "expert," privately observes the state with a certain probability i . We call i the "quality" of an expert as it re ‡ects the expert's ability to gather the necessary information. Unlike some of the existing models of persuasion where the judge chooses between just two actions (Shin, 1998; Glazer and Rubinstein, 2001 ) we assume a richer, continuous action space. An expert A i 's preference is described by his ideal action, or, "agenda," x i . Irrespective of the underlying state, he prefers that the judge take an action as close to x i as possible. We assume that the relevant information consists of hard evidence (e.g., legal documents) which can be veri…ed. An informed expert has the choice to either report the state or to feign ignorance and pool with the genuinely uninformed.
1;2 So, an informed expert reveals information only if he …nds the state favorable. However, a state that is unfavorable to one expert may be favorable to another, and thus competition may mitigate the problem of information manipulation. We assume that the judge cannot commit to an action that would maximize the likelihood of truth-telling. Moreover, the judge cannot write contracts to "buy information" from experts. Thus, the experts'incentives are driven only by the judge's action.
As a concrete example of the environment described above, consider a judge listening to the expert reports from both the plainti¤ and the defendant to decide on the amount of a monetary damage that the defendant must pay to the plainti¤. 3 The plainti¤'s expert prefers a higher damage payment whereas the defendant's expert attempts to lower the damage amount. We assume that both experts have access to the same data or evidence, which is a natural assumption in many judicial systems where both sides of the litigation get equal access to all "discovery documents" of the case. However, the experts vary in terms of their abilities to assess the extent of damage by analyzing the available data. The available data and the experts'analyses are veri…able evidence and cannot be fabricated. Thus, if an expert fails to analyze the data e¤ectively, his …ndings are necessarily uninformative and he cannot produce any assessment of the damage. In contrast, if an expert can successfully analyze the data he has two options: either to reveal his assessment or to withhold it, claiming to have failed to analyze the data. A "better"expert is more likely to be able to analyze the data and reach a de…nite conclusion about the true extent of the harm caused by the defendant.
In the above scenario, the experts are extreme and opposed in the sense that while one prefers the highest possible action (damages), the other prefers as low an action as possible. Our setting 1 In many judicial settings, feigning ignorance to suppress unfavorable information is indeed a commonly used rhetorical tactic, especially when the cost of perjury is steep. Perhaps an extreme example of such a strategy is the much publicized testimony of former US Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to the Senate Judiciary Committee that subsequently led to his resignation. Facing charges of politicizing his o¢ ce through wrongful dismissal of several US District Attorneys, "Gonzales also repeatedly angered lawmakers by saying that he could not recall key episodes and details related to the U.S. attorneys' dismissals, testifying nearly 70 times at one hearing alone that he could not remember speci…c events." ("Embattled Gonzales Resigns," by Dan Eggen and Michael A. Fletcher, Washington Post, August 28, 2007.) 2 A similar strategy set for the experts is also assumed by Shavell (1989) in the model of pre-settlement information sharing between the plainti¤ and the defendant. Also see Dziuda (2010) for a model of persuasion where experts may strategically pool across types to obfuscate information revelation. 3 A similar setting is also considered by Shin (1994) .
extends to situations where experts may prefer a moderate action. For example, suppose that the government needs to decide on its foreign policy towards a potentially hostile country. The optimal extent of military intervention depends on a complex array of geopolitical issues on which the government lacks the necessary information. The government seeks this information from a panel of defense strategists who may have strong ideological views on the use of armed force-irrespective of the state, a "hawkish"expert may prefer a stronger military action whereas a "dove"may prefer a diplomatic solution. But it is plausible that a hawkish expert does acknowledge the role for diplomacy in con ‡ict resolution and a "dove" also agrees on the need for occasional use of force. A similar case may arise in the context of policy-making on various socioeconomic issues, such as entitlement programs, civil and political rights, gun control, etc. While the policymaker may want to design such policies to maximize the well-being of a particular constituency, an expert may not care about the a¤ected constituents, per se, and may prefer to align the policy with his own political ideology/moral views (that need not be extreme).
In this setting, when any expert reveals the true state , the judge takes the action that matches . It turns out that the equilibrium of this game is completely characterized by the "default action" of the judge-the action y (say) that the judge takes when all experts fail to report the state. Note that an expert's report matters only in the event when no other expert reveals the state. 4 So, he reports the state if and only if is more favorable to him than y (in other words, between the default action (y ) and the true state ( ), the latter is closer to his ideal point x i ). Therefore, an (informed) expert's disclosure strategy is represented by a revelation set, i.e., the states which he would report truthfully to the judge. In particular, each expert's revelation set is a set of "favorable states"close to his ideal action and the judge's default action y is the best-response to such disclosure strategies of the experts. This observation leads to a simple characterization of the equilibrium. Also, the equilibrium is robust to whether the experts report simultaneously or in any pre-speci…ed sequence.
In order to explore the implications of our model for the design of expert panels, we con…ne attention to the case where the state/action space is the unit interval, and there are only two experts, A 0 and A 1 ; say. 5 The unit interval allows for an unambiguous ordering of the actions and helps capture the extent of con ‡ict between the experts and the quality of decision-making. In this case, the revelation sets of each expert is an interval in the state space with y being a boundary point.
An interesting …nding of our model is that when experts are moderate, a better expert (i.e. an expert who is informed with a higher probability) does not guarantee better decisions-it can lead to either better or worse outcomes depending on the underlying parameters. The intuition is as follows. A small change in an expert's quality has two e¤ects: a direct e¤ect where the default action changes, given the experts'revelation sets and a strategic e¤ect where the revelation sets of the experts change due to the change in the default action. Since the judge chooses y simply as her best response to the experts'revelation strategy and fails to internalize the impact of her choice on the revelation sets, such a change might leave her worse o¤. However, when both experts have extreme agenda, the impact of the strategic e¤ect on the expected decision quality is negligible and the perverse comparative static result does not arise.
As we can vary the divergence of preferences among the experts as a parameter of the model, we can also examine the optimal degree of con ‡ict from the point of view of the judge. If the judge 4 Several authors (e.g., Wolinsky, 2002; Gerardi, et al 2009) who study the issue of information extraction from experts with divergent agends from a mechanism design approach also make use of the idea that experts condition their report on the event of being pivotal. 5 Indeed, one-dimensional debates are of special interest. As argued by Spector (2000) , multidimensional debates have a tendency to be reduced to single-dimensional ones: when preferences of the debaters are similar but beliefs about the consequences of the various decisions diverge, under certain conditions, public communication either resolves the disagreement between beliefs or the debate becomes one-dimensional at the limit.
were to choose the con…guration of ideal points in the expert panel in order to maximize her ex-ante payo¤, what would she choose? We make two important points regarding this choice. First, we show that it is always optimal for the judge to choose extreme (or activist) experts (i.e., x i 2 f0; 1g) because such experts have the maximum incentive to reveal information. For any given default action, the judge can obtain a larger revelation set by "moving" an expert towards the extreme. This leaves us with the two polar cases-one with extreme and opposed experts (i.e., x 0 = 0 and x 1 = 1) and the other with extreme but similar experts (i.e., x 0 = x 1 = 0 or x 0 = x 1 = 1).
A comparison of these two polar cases demonstrates an important trade-o¤ relevant to the design of expert panels. In the case with opposed experts, the equilibrium revelation sets are [0; y ] for A 0 and [y ; 1] for A 1 : The revelation sets "cover" the state space-conditional on both experts having observed the state, it will always be revealed to the judge. On the other hand, in the case with x 0 = x 1 = 0; the revelation set for both experts is [0; y ]: In this case, if the state is in [0; y ]; it gets reported if either expert observes the state, but states higher than y never get revealed. Thus, with similar experts, a high default action o¤ers a strong incentive for information revelation to both experts simultaneously (both of them end up with a low payo¤ in case they fail to reveal the state) even though information is surely lost for a subset of states.
We argue that in the face of this trade-o¤ it may be optimal to use identical but extreme experts. 6 For instance, our result suggests that while deciding on foreign policy, it may be bene…cial for the government to employ a panel of antiwar activists and to threaten them with a very hawkish policy unless the activists can present convincing evidence to the contrary, rather than to have a diverse panel with hawks and doves together. This …nding is in sharp contrast with the existing literature that by and large supports the use of competing experts.
Related Literature: While we have already mentioned how some of the key assumptions of the our model bear resemblance with the frameworks used in the extant literature, in what follows, we relate our work to some of the broad strands of the literature on strategic communications.
In the literature on persuasion games, this article closely relates to Shin (1994) , especially for the case of the completely opposed experts. Shin argues that the "burden of proof"should lie more with the expert who is better informed ex-ante; i.e., the judge's default action (y ) should favor the expert who has a lower probability of observing the state. However, Shin uses an information structure where the amount of revelation by the experts is independent of the burden of proof. In contrast, we explicitly model the the mutual interdependence of experts'and the judge's strategies and highlight how the overall informational content of the debate is a¤ected by the information that each expert has. 7 The cheap talk literature has also focussed on the question of information revelation in the presence of multiple senders of information. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) and Austen-Smith (1990 , 1993 are some early models analyzing informational properties of "debates" between multiple experts with divergent interests in a cheap talk setting. Among the more recent contributions, Krishna and Morgan (2001) explores the value of competition (i.e., experts with con ‡icting biases) in improving communication in the unidimensional state/action space. In a related work, Battaglini (2002) shows that if the state/action space is multidimensional and unbounded, then there is an equilibrium where the state is always revealed. While the cheap talk literature usually assumes that the experts always know the state, we are interested in a situation where there is uncertainty about 6 We later show that is several commonly studied environments (e.g., uniform distribution and quadratic loss), the judge's expected payo¤ is always maximized when experts have identical but extreme agenda. 7 In a recent work, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2011) also explore the role of competition in persuasion games and …nd that an increase in competition (weakly) increases the amount of information revelation. However, they consider a signal structure that is considerably di¤erent from ours where the senders can choose the coarseness of the signal and the senders'reports may be arbitrarily correlated.
what an expert knows. 8 In our model too, when the experts have completely opposed agenda, information is fully revealed to the judge in the event that both experts know the state. This result is similar to the full revelation result with opposed biases in Krishna and Morgan (2001) . However, we point out that the uncertainty about the experts'information opens up new channels of strategic information manipulation that the judge has to contend with. Moreover, competition may limit the ability of the judge to simultaneously induce all experts to reveal information, and under certain circumstances, the judge may be better o¤ by employing experts with extreme but completely identical preferences.
The above …nding is in sharp contrast with an in ‡uential article by Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) who argues in favor of using competing experts to address the moral hazard problem involved in costly information acquisition. In the same vein, Shin (1998) shows that even if the judge is as well informed as the experts, on an average it is better to employ completely opposed experts than the judge undertaking his own investigation. Also, in a model where experts engage in costly information acquisition, Gerardi and Yariv (2010) shows that if experts can report in sequence, the optimal mechanism involves using opposing experts.
Finally, there is also a line of work where the judge is assumed to be able to commit to a mechanism to elicit the truth from multiple experts by exploiting the divergence in interests. This literature includes Wolinsky (2002) and Gerardi et al. (2009) which have been mentioned before. 9 While the mechanism design literature emphasizes how the di¤erences in the experts'preferences may be exploited for eliciting the truth, we show that the judge might optimally want to have experts with similar preferences, even if she could commit to an optimal default action.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. The next section presents the model. In section 3, we …rst provide a general characterization of the equilibrium, and then examine the special case of unidimensional state/action space in more detail. Section 4 analyzes how the quality of the experts a¤ects the quality of the decision making and how this linkage is a¤ected by the diversity of the experts'agenda. Section 5 addresses the question of optimal panel design and some extensions of the model are considered in section 6. A …nal section concludes.
Model
We consider a persuasion game between n experts, A 0 ; :::; A n 1 , and a judge. The judge needs to choose an action y 2 Y that is most appropriate given the underlying state of the nature 2 : We assume that Y = ; and it is a compact and convex subset of R k . The payo¤ of the judge from taking action y in state is u J (y; ), where u J is continuous and twice di¤erentiable in both its arguments. Moreover, given ; u J (y; ) is strictly concave in y and is maximized at y = : We normalize the maximal payo¤ u J ( ; ) to 0. E¤ectively then, we assume that the judge wants her action to be as close to the state as possible and interpret u J as the loss from taking an action di¤erent from the state. An expert A i , on the other hand, prefers the judge's action to be as close to his ideal action x i 2 Y as possible, independent of the realized state. The payo¤ of expert A i from action y is given by u i (y; x i ) = v (ky x i k) for some strictly decreasing function v. Thus, the payo¤ of expert A i is assumed to be symmetric and single-peaked around x i . We refer to the parameter x i as the agenda of expert A i :
The judge cannot observe directly but has a (commonly known) prior belief on that is given by the probability distribution function F ( ) (and the associated density function f ( )) that is continuous and has full support on . Before choosing her action, the judge receives a report, m i , 8 The cheap talk literature also typically assumes that the experts' ideal actions are state-dependent. A notable exception is Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) who consider experts with state-independent ideal actions. from each of the n experts who may or may not have observed the realized value of . Expert A i 's type, t i , can either be "informed"(t i = 1) or "uninformed"(t i = 0), where Pr (t i = 1) = i 2 [0; 1). An informed expert observes the state whereas an uninformed expert does not. Since i represents expert A i 's prior likelihood of being informed, we can interpret i as a measure of the "quality" of the expert. We assume that any report about the state is veri…able. So, upon observing the state , an informed expert is left with the choice of whether to disclose the state (i.e., m i = ) or conceal it (i.e., m i = ;, say) 10 . Also, the reporting is assumed to be costless to the expert and it a¤ects his payo¤ only through its impact on the judge's action.
The (pure) strategy of an informed expert A i is m i ( ) 2 f ; ;g for all 2 and that of an uninformed expert is m i = ; (by assumption).
11 Denote a pro…le of reports from all experts fm 0 ; m 1 ; :::; m n 1 g by m: For any state ; denote by m i ( ) the pro…le of reports of all experts except A i : Finally, let y = y (m) be the action taken by the judge upon receiving the report pro…le m.
We use perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBE) as the solution concept. Let ( j m) be the posterior belief of the judge upon receiving the experts'reports m. A strategy pro…le hm ; y (m)i along with a belief constitutes a PBE of this game if the following holds: (i) For all i, if A i is informed, then for all 2 , m i ( ) = if and only if,
where the expectation is taken over the types of all other experts. And if A i is uninformed, m i = ;.
(ii) The judge's action
for all m.
(iii) The posterior belief of the judge ( j m) is obtained by using Bayes rule given the prior belief F ( ) and the strategy pro…le of the experts, m . Also, if an expert takes an out-of-equilibrium action that reveals the state , the o¤-equilibrium belief is only allowed to put weight on .
We conclude this section with the following two remarks on our modeling speci…cations: First, note that our de…nition of the PBE imposes an o¤-the-equilibrium path belief restriction that is not a part of the canonical de…nition. In the canonical de…nition, the agents' action sets are independent of their types-an assumption that is violated in our setting. Hence, we need to impose the aforementioned restriction in order to be consistent with our modeling speci…cation.
Second, while we have assumed that the experts'preferences are independent of the state, this assumption is not essential for our results. We maintain this assumption as it considerably improves the analytical tractability of our model, and in section 6.2 we discuss the robustness of our …ndings in a scenario where the experts directly care about the state. It is, however, important to note that state-independent preference for the experts is a common assumption in the persuasion game literature (see, e.g., Milgrom, 1981; Fishman and Hagerty, 1990; Shin, 1994 Shin, , 1998 Glazer and Rubinstein, 2001 , 2006 . 12 Finally, as discussed in the introduction, one may also argue that 10 Our model is robust to a more general speci…cation of the expert's action space where one can report any subset of the state space as long as it contains the true state; (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1986; Shin, 1994) . See section 3 and Appendix B for details. 11 Our focus on the pure strategy equilibria is without loss of generality. This is due to the fact that uJ is concave and F is atom-less. 12 This is in sharp contrast with the cheap-talk literature where usually the experts'preferences are assumed to be state-dependent (Crawford and Sobel, 1982). Indeed, this assumption is critical in the cheap-talk literature-when the message is non-veri…able, informative communication is di¢ cult to sustain unless the sender and the receiver's preferences are partially aligned (i.e, the state a¤ects the payo¤s of both the players). But when the message is veri…able-as commonly assumed in the persuasion game literature-the veri…ability of the message considerably restricts the sender's ability to garble information. Thus, there is scope for informative communication even when the players'preferences are not aligned.
this assumption is realistic in many persuasion game contexts, such as litigation, expert panels on public policy, etc., where the experts need not care about the "truth" per se, and attempt to manipulate the decision-maker's action towards their own interests.
Equilibrium characterization
As we have mentioned in the introduction, an equilibrium in this game is completely characterized by the "default" action of the judge, i.e., the action that the judge would take if all experts fail to reveal the state. In what follows, we …rst present a general characterization of the equilibrium for an arbitrary state space. We then focus on a special case of unidimensional state space that is of particular relevance for our subsequent analysis.
3.1. General characterization. In order to characterize the equilibrium, …rst consider the judge's strategy. The best-response of the judge upon receiving the report pro…le (m) is:
where y = arg max
In other words, if at least one expert reveals the state, the judge trivially takes the action that exactly matches the state. But when all experts fail to reveal the state, then the judge takes a "default" action y that maximizes her expected payo¤ taking into account the experts'reporting strategies.
An informed expert A i 's strategy is characterized by her "revelation set" i ; i.e., the set of states over which she reports truthfully. Suppose A i observes that the state is : If he (or any other expert) reveals the state, an action will be induced. In contrast, if he conceals the state and no other expert reports, the judge takes the default action (y). Thus, A i decides to report or not conditioning on the event that he is pivotal in determining whether the judge will take the action or y. Now, given any state , A i reveals if and only if u i ( ; x i ) u i (y; x i ). As u i is single peaked and symmetric around x i ; u i ( ; x i ) u i (y; x i ) if and only if k x i k ky x i k. Therefore, A i reveals the state if and only if A i 's agenda (x i ) is closer to the observed state ( ) than the agenda is to the judge's default action (y). Hence, given the default action y; the "revelation set" for expert A i is i = f 2 j k x i k ky x i kg. The above discussion is summarized in the following proposition that characterizes the equilibrium of the game. Proposition 1. There always exists a PBE of this game. Moreover, in any PBE of this game an informed expert's strategy is:
otherwise and the judge's strategy is:
In this context, several issues are worth noting. First, the above characterization result tells us that in equilibrium, an (informed) expert A i 's revelation set i is a sphere in R k centered around the expert's agenda x i . Also, in equilibrium, all revelation sets must share a common boundary point y , which is the equilibrium default action of the judge.
Second, the equilibrium characterization does not change even if the experts send their messages sequentially. If the experts are asked to speak in some pre-speci…ed order, or some subset (possibly all) of them may be asked to speak simultaneously, the sequence of reports does not make a di¤erence as each expert's decision is conditioned on the event that he is pivotal. It is also easy to see that the outcome will be the same even if some experts knew the reports of some of the other experts before they spoke. The fact that all informed experts have the same information is important for this feature of our model. 13 This …nding is similar in spirit with Dekel and Piccione (2000) who show, in the context of a voting game, that the symmetric equilibria of the simultaneous voting game are also equilibria in any sequential voting structure.
Finally, such an equilibrium characterization continues to hold if one consider a more general strategy space for the experts a la Milgrom and Roberts (1986) where an informed expert reports a subset of states, say S i , that contains the true state (see, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) . Under the expanded strategy space, the above equilibrium is supported by an o¤-the-equilibrium belief that is similar in spirit with the "skeptical posture" discussed by Milgrom and Roberts (1986)-if no expert reports the state and some expert A i deviates and reports a strict subset S i of the state space, then the judge believes that the true state is the one in S i that is least favorable to A i . 14 3.2. Unidimensional state space. Given the general characterization of the equilibrium, we now focus our attention to the canonical setting of two experts and unidimensional state space, = [0; 1]. Such a state space has the feature that the preference ordering over the states for one expert may be the complete opposite of the ordering for his rival expert. As we are primarily interested in exploring the link between the extent of con ‡ict between the experts and the quality of decision making, the case of unidimensional state space is particularly relevant and we will con…ne our attention to such an environment in the rest of this article.
The speci…city of this setting also allows us to analyze the equilibrium characteristics in further details. In particular, we can highlight how the nature of the debate is in ‡uenced by the diversity of the experts'agenda. To this e¤ect, we …rst present a corollary to Proposition 1 that characterizes the equilibrium in this environment. 
where y is given by the equation
Moreover, y always lies in (0; 1).
Corollary 1 indicates that the experts' equilibrium revelation sets, i , are intervals in R that share the judge's default action y as a common boundary point. Using this simple characterizations we can now explore the link between the diversity of agenda and the nature of the persuasion.
To begin with, consider the case where the experts have "extreme"agenda; i.e., x i is either 0 or 1. Note that this setting includes both the canonical model of completely opposed experts where 13 Ottaviani and Sorensen (2001) show that in presence of reputational concerns, the sequencing of experts does matter. In our case, the experts are concerned not with their reputation but only with the …nal action, and in this setting, the sequence is immaterial.
14 See Appendix B for a complete analysis of this case.
x 0 = 0 and x 1 = 1; and the case of the "extreme but identical" experts where x i = 0 or 1 for all i = 0; 1. , where y 01 , y 00 , and y 11 , all lying in (0; 1), are the default action of the judge in the respective cases (as derived from equation (2)).
The key features of this equilibrium are intuitive. First, consider the case of completely opposed experts (x 0 = 0 and x 1 = 1). In equilibrium, the state space is partitioned into two revelation sets, each set containing states deemed favorable by one expert but unfavorable by the other. In this sense, we say that the equilibrium re ‡ects "con ‡ict" between the experts. States less than y 01 are revealed by A 0 and concealed by A 1 and the opposite holds for the states greater than y 01 . 15 Also note that if both experts are informed, then the true state is necessarily revealed in equilibrium.
In contrast, when the experts'agenda are identical (i.e., x i = 0 or 1 for all i = 0; 1), so are their revelation sets. As in the case of con ‡ict, the state space is partitioned into two subsets. The judge never learns the state if it is outside the experts'revelation set but if the state lies in the revelation set, the judge learns it if at least one of the two experts are informed. In this case, we say that the equilibrium re ‡ects "congruence"between the experts-both experts agree on the set of states that they prefer to reveal. Now, consider a more general environment where the experts may be moderate in the sense that 0 < x 0 x 1 < 1. It turns out that while the equilibrium is unique with extreme experts, with moderate experts, the game may have multiple equilibria. As we let the expert agenda vary, much like the extreme expert case we can have two classes of equilibria: one with con ‡ict where the revelation sets are disjoint (but always adjacent) and another with (partial) congruence where one expert's revelation set is a weak subset of the other's. However, with the same primitives, some equilibria may exhibit con ‡ict and some may exhibit partial congruence. The following example illustrates this point. The above example also highlights the fact that the degree of opposition between the experts' agenda need not indicate whether the experts'interests in equilibrium are in con ‡ict or in (partial) congruence. For the same underlying parameters there can be multiple equilibria depending on the coordination between the players.
At this stage, we introduce an important distinction between equilibria which will prove to be useful in the next section when discussing the comparative static properties. Consider a small change in x i ; the agenda of expert (as always the case with extreme experts), such a change in expert agenda will not change the equilibrium outcome. On the other hand, if the experts are moderate, it may be the case that even a small change in expert agenda may alter equilibrium outcomes, depending on the particular equilibrium being played. For example, while every equilibrium in Example 1 is sensitive to a change in x 0 ; the outcome of the partially congruent equilibrium with y = 0:1826 is not sensitive to a small change in x 1 : The following de…nition distinguishes equilibria that are sensitive to local changes in expert agenda from those that are not.
De…nition 1.
Consider an equilibrium of the persuasion game where the judge's default action is y . The equilibrium is said to be "locally insensitive" to the experts' agenda if for each expert A i ; either x i < y =2 or x i > (1 + y ) =2, i = 0; 1.
It is easy to see that if both experts have extreme agenda, the unique equilibrium is locally insensitive to experts'agenda. This feature leads to special comparative static properties that hold true when the agenda are extreme, but are not guaranteed when they are moderate.
Diversity of agenda and the value of information
We now focus on relationship between the quality of experts (as measured by i , the ex-ante likelihood of the expert being informed) and the quality of decision-making (as measured by the exante equilibrium payo¤ of the judge). The model suggests that the e¤ect of expert quality depends crucially on the whether the experts have extreme or moderate agenda.
Consider how a marginal change in 0 , (i.e., the quality of A 0 ) will a¤ect the equilibrium payo¤ of the judge. First, it will lead to a positive direct e¤ect: given A 0 's revelation set 0 , an increase in A 0 's likelihood of observing the true state eliminates the judge's loss when the state is in 0 . But there is also a strategic e¤ect: a change in 0 will lead the equilibrium default action to shift and this will lead both experts to adjust their revelation sets accordingly. Each expert will reveal some states not being revealed earlier and conceal some states that were disclosed before, and the aggregate impact on the judge's payo¤ cannot be signed a priori. Thus the sign of the strategic e¤ect is ambiguous and if this e¤ect is strong and negative, we may end up with a situation where an improvement in expert quality makes the judge worse o¤ ex-ante.
However, note that if the particular equilibrium is locally insensitive (i.e. the revelation sets are either [0; y ] or [y ; 1]), then a small change in y will change the revelation sets only close to y . Given our assumption that u 0 J (y ; ) = 0 at = y , a change in the revelation strategy over states very close to y has no …rst order e¤ect. Therefore, if the equilibrium is locally insensitive to expert agenda, the strategic e¤ect vanishes and an increase in expert quality is guaranteed to improve the judge's payo¤. Now, recall that if both experts have extreme agenda, the unique equilibrium is locally insensitive. So, our discussion above implies that with extreme agenda, an increase in the quality of either expert is always bene…cial for the judge but when at least one expert is moderate, higher quality of expert does not necessarily mean large ex-ante payo¤ for the judge. The following proposition and its corollary formalize this point.
Proposition 3. Consider a persuasion game with 0 x 0 x 1 1: The judge's ex-ante equilibrium payo¤ , E [u J (y ; ) j m ], is increasing in an expert's quality i if the equilibrium is locally insensitive to the expert agenda. Otherwise, the sign of
is ambiguous. Moreover, there exist parameters for which the judge's ex-ante equilibrium payo¤ decreases in an expert's quality.
Corollary 2. When the experts have extreme agenda (i.e. x i 2 f0; 1g for i = 0; 1), the judge's ex-ante equilibrium payo¤ is increasing in an expert's quality; i.e.,
To see the intuition behind the proposition, consider a con ‡ict equilibrium. 16 Suppose that the judge's default action is y 2 (x 0 ; x 1 ) and the revelation sets are 0 = [l 0 ; y ] and 1 = [y ; h 1 ] ; where l 0 = max f2x 0 y ; 0g and h 1 = min f2x 1 y ; 1g. Suppose that 0 increases. Using equation (2), one obtains:
The term R y l 0 u J (y ; ) dF > 0 is the direct e¤ect, and the expression in square brackets is the strategic e¤ect. In general, the strategic e¤ect cannot be signed. However, if the equilibrium is locally insensitive, i.e. if l 0 = 0 and h 1 = 1; then the strategic e¤ect reduces to zero, and the overall e¤ect is equal to the positive direct e¤ect.
In the environment of example 1, we show that an increase in expert quality may indeed make the judge worse o¤. The following remarks are in order. First, note that an increase in i can be reinterpreted as the arrival of an additional expert who shares the same agenda with expert A i : One interpretation of Proposition 3 is that when experts are extreme, bringing additional experts always bene…ts the judge but the marginal value of an additional expert may be negative when at least one expert has moderate agenda.
Another important observation in the context of Proposition 3 is that in the extreme expert case, an increase in the quality of an expert induces the default action to move away from the expert's agenda and expand the expert's revelation set (see the proof of Proposition 3). This implies that when the experts are opposed, an improvement in an expert's quality leads the default action to be more favorable to the other expert. 18 This result is similar in spirit with the …ndings in Shin (1994) who argues that the burden of proof should lie with the more informed expert, i.e., the default action favors the less informed expert. It is also reminiscent of Che and Kartik (2009) who derive a similar result in a single expert model.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that if the judge could commit to a default action, then she could internalize the experts' response to changes in her own action. One can argue that in this case, an increase in expert quality would always make the judge better o¤. 1 9 Therefore, we can attribute 16 A similar argument applies for the case of partially congruent equilibrium. 17 While Example 2 presents the "perverse" comparative static for a con ‡ict equilibrium, see section 7 for an example where the comparative static arises for an equilibrium with congruence. 18 Formally, if x0 = 0 and x1 = 1; then @y =@ 0 > 0 and @y =@ 1 < 0. We skip the proof as its derivation is trivial. 1 9 When the judge commits to y , routine application of the envelope theorem implies that the strategic e¤ect in equation (3) is zero. the "perverse" comparative static result in proposition 3 to the lack of commitment power of the judge.
Also recall that if the experts have extreme agenda, then, too, the strategic e¤ect is of second order. Because of this fact, when the agenda are extreme, the outcome (and hence the payo¤ to the respective players) is the same irrespective of whether the judge can commit to a default action or not. Since this fact proves to be very useful for the studying the issue of optimal panel design in the next section, we summarize it below as a formal proposition. Proposition 4. If both experts have extreme agenda (i.e., x i 2 f0; 1g for i = 0; 1) then the judge's ability to commit to a default action does not a¤ ect the equilibrium outcome: the equilibrium default action and the associated expected payo¤ of the judge remains the same as in the case where she does not have such commitment power.
Optimal panel design
As discussed in the introduction, in many real-world environments the decision maker has discretion over the selection of the members in the expert panel. What type of panel is most conducive to information revelation? That is, if the judge can select (or "commission") two experts from a continuum of experts with their ideal points distributed over state space [0; 1], what should she choose to maximize her ex-ante payo¤?
Our …rst result is that, when forming the optimal panel, without loss of generality the judge can restrict attention to the panels with extreme experts. This result crucially depends on the insight yielded by Proposition 4.
Proposition 5.
If the judge could select the agenda pro…le fx 0 ; x 1 g of the experts (given the other parameters) then irrespective of whether the judge can commit to a default action or not, one of the following agenda pro…les is always optimal: f0; 1g; f0; 0g and f1; 1g.
The proof proceeds by showing that in the class of con ‡ict equilibria (x 0 < y < x 1 ), the highest payo¤ is obtained in the case with extreme and opposed experts (x 0 = 0 and x 1 = 1); among the class of (partially) congruent equilibria with x 0 x 1 < y ; the highest payo¤ is obtained in the case with extreme and identical experts (x 0 = x 1 = 0); and among the (partially) congruent equilibria with y < x 0 x 1 ; the highest payo¤ is obtained in the case with extreme and identical experts (x 0 = x 1 = 0): We demonstrate the intuition for the case with con ‡ict equilibria.
Consider a con ‡ict equilibrium with agenda pro…le fx 0 ; x 1 g and default action y . It is straightforward to note that if the judge could commit to a default action, replacing the agenda pro…le fx 0 ; x 1 g by f0; 1g would make her better o¤. 20 But according to Proposition 4, when the agenda pro…le is f0; 1g, commitment power has no value to the judge-without any commitment power she earns the same payo¤ that she would get if she could commit to her default action. Thus, even when the judge has no commitment power, her payo¤ increases when she chooses the agenda pro…le f0; 1g over fx 0 ; x 1 g. Now, observe that Proposition 5 indicates a possibility that completely opposed experts may be dominated by identical but extreme experts. When the experts stand at opposite extremes, an expansion of A 0 's revelation set (i.e., 0 = [0; y ]) necessarily dampens A 1 's incentives for disclosure (i.e., 1 = [y ; 1] shrinks). Such a countervailing e¤ect disappears when both experts stand at the same extreme, say at 0. In this case, a default action su¢ ciently away from 0 gives both experts strong incentives to reveal the state (if they are indeed informed) but the judge is guaranteed to 20 The argument is as follows: even when the judge can commit to her action, the default action y remains a feasible choice, and under this choice, the revelation sets (weakly) expand from [maxf2x0 y ; 0g; y ] to [0; y ] for A0 and from [y ; minf2x1 y ; 1g] to [y ; 1] for A1: lose information if the state is in [y ; 1]. In contrast, with opposed experts, all states are necessarily revealed when both experts are informed.
Thus, the judge faces the following trade-o¤: a panel with identical (extreme) experts increases the likelihood of learning the states in [0; y ] but information is necessarily lost if the state is in [y ; 1]. The judge would prefer identical experts if the gain from additional information on low states (i.e., when y ) outweigh the loss from the absence of information on high states (i.e., when > y ). Which one of these two e¤ects dominates depends on the judge's loss function and the underlying distribution of the states. But interestingly, as the following proposition suggests, panel with identical and extreme experts is indeed optimal in some of the most commonly studied environments in the strategic communication literature.
Proposition 6. Suppose that is uniformly distributed over [0; 1] and the judge's payo¤ is u J (y; ) = (y ) 2 . Then for all values of 0 and 1 , it is optimal to form a panel with identical extreme experts.
We conclude this section with the following remarks. First, the optimality of choosing identical experts runs contrary to the received wisdom that experts with opposing agenda facilitate information revelation as their competing interests mitigate each other's attempt to conceal unfavorable information. 21 A similar intuition is also suggested in the mechanism design literature (Wolinsky, 2002; Gerardi, et al., 2009 ) that emphasizes how the di¤erences in the experts'preferences may be exploited to for elicit the truth.
Second, our …nding is also in contrast with the some of the existing models of persuasion games such as Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) that argue for the optimality of advocacy. Dewatripont and Tirole consider a di¤erent information structure where each expert can only look for an evidence that is favorable to his agenda and an expert needs to (privately) exert e¤ort to …nd the evidence. Consequently, the judge faces a moral hazard problem that can be resolved through the competition between the opposing expert. The moral hazard problem is absent in our environment as the observation on the state is assumed to be costless for an informed expert. 22 Finally, an alternative interpretation of this …nding is that a single expert with extreme preferences (i.e., an "activist", say), if su¢ ciently able, may be better for the judge than any panel with two experts. Thus, our …nding o¤ers a novel justi…cation for decisions making based on the information provided by a single expert, rather than through competitive advocacy.
Discussion
In this section, we further elaborate on the issue equilibrium characterization by considering speci…c functional forms. We also highlight a few extensions of our model to explore the robustness of our key …ndings in environments where the expert may care for the true state of the world. 21 This argument is also common in public debates. For example, in April 2012, the Governor of Florida set up a panel of experts to review the controversial "Stand Your Ground" law on the use of …re arms in self-defense. The Governor was criticized for supposedly forming an "unbalanced panel" as several panelists were known to support gun rights and the existing version of the law (see, "Stand Your Ground task force to hold public hearings," by Toluse Olorunnipa, Miami Herald, May 1, 2012). Our …nding suggests that this argument may be misguided as an "unbalanced" panel may indeed lead to a better decision making. 22 Note that by the virtue of the continuity of the payo¤ functions, even if we assume that information acquisition is costly for the experts, it would still be the case that the judge has higher payo¤ from congruent experts as compared to competing experts as long as the cost of information acquisition is su¢ ciently small. 6.1. Equilibrium characterization with parametric restrictions. Our discussion so far suggests that the nature of the set of equilibria is highly dependent on the particular set of parameters under consideration. But for a given set of parameters would all equilibria exhibit similar comparative static properties? Also, can the equilibria be Pareto ranked? To address these issues we characterize the complete set of equilibria in the canonical environment where the judge's loss function is quadratic and the prior distribution of the state is uniform. Moreover, we focus on the case where the experts have identical agenda: x 0 = x 1 = x 2 (0; 1). 23 We show that the answer to both of the above questions is negative.
Note that without loss of generality, we can restrict attention to the case where x 1=2: Proposition 7 describes the set of equilibria and their comparative statics properties. In the proposition, we use the following notation for the sake of brevity: let = 1 (1 0 )(1 1 ). Denote by P the set of parameters (x; ) where 3=4 and x 2 [1=2 1=8 ; y 00 =2]. And as before, y 00 denotes the equilibrium default action when x 0 = x 1 = 0. (ii) If x 2 [0; y 00 =2), then there always exists an equilibrium where y = y 00 and both experts' revelation set is [0; y 00 ]. Moreover, this equilibrium is also unique when (x; ) 6 2 P. If (x; ) 2 P, then there exists another equilibrium where y = x+t + and both experts'revelation set is [x t + ; y ] where
(iii) Finally, in the equilibrium where y = x+t + , the judge's ex-ante payo¤ (i.e., E [u J (y ; ) j m ]) decreases in the experts' quality i . In all other equilibria, E [u J (y ; ) j m ] is increasing in i (i = 0; 1).
Proposition 7 implies that for the same set of parameters, the comparative statics properties of di¤erent equilibria might be di¤erent. Consider the two equilibria for any (x; ) 2 P and recall that one is locally insensitive (with revelation sets [0; y 00 ]) while the other is not (with revelation sets [x t + ; y ]). We know from Proposition 3 that in the locally insensitive equilibrium an increase in expert quality always increases the judge's ex-ante payo¤. However, Proposition 7 indicates that in the locally sensitive equilibrium the judge's payo¤ decreases in the quality of either expert.
It is also instructive to note that the equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. For any (x; ) 2 P, the judge and the experts have exactly opposite (and strict) preference over the two equilibria: both experts prefer the equilibrium with a smaller revelation set-which, in this case, is the locally sensitive one-whereas the judge gets a larger payo¤ in the locally insensitive equilibrium.
Finally, as an increase in can be conceived as the judge recruiting another expert who has the same agenda (x), the proposition above lays out a scenario arising in a canonical environment where the judge may be better o¤ with fewer experts; the su¢ cient condition being (x; ) 2 P and the equilibrium chosen is the one preferred by experts.
6.2. Experts with state-dependent preferences. So far, we have assumed that the experts do not directly care about the underlying state, and irrespective of the state, an expert's payo¤ increases as the judge's action becomes closer to the expert's agenda. But one may argue that in some settings, an expert's agenda may be correlated with the underlying state of the world or the expert may directly care about the quality of decision-making (e.g., the expert's reputation may be damaged if his report leads to an egregiously "wrong" decision by the judge). One can easily extend our model by directly incorporating the state in the expert's payo¤. Suppose that = [0; 1] and the payo¤ of expert A i is
where 2 (1=2; 1]. That is, A i 's payo¤ is a convex combination of the proximity of the decision to his agenda (i.e., x i y) and the error in decision-making (i.e., y ). However, the expert is assumed to care more about a former than the latter (i.e., > 1=2). Under the preference speci…ed above, the most preferred action for the expert is given byx i ( ) = x i + (1 ) ; and for any given default action of the judge, y , the revelation set is given as:
Observe that the qualitative nature of the revelation sets is the same as in the case of our previous model: for any given y , an expert A i 's revelation set is locally insensitive only if his agenda x i is su¢ ciently extreme. Hence, all our results remain qualitatively unchanged in this altered setting.
Paying for information revelation.
A potentially alternative method to induce the expert to reveal the state is to o¤er monetary payments for the information. We argue that the salient themes of our analysis continue to hold even if we allow for such a payment. Suppose that = [0; 1] and the decision maker o¤ers a price p to an expert if he reveals the state. For a given payment p and a default action y the revelation set of expert A i becomes i = f j jx i j p jx i y jg, or,
Note that for a given y , the revelation set expands with p. This observation is quite intuitive as the payment increases the expert's incentive for information revelation. However, the default action y now lies in the interior of the set. This feature implies that even if the experts have extreme agenda, an increase in an expert's quality may decrease the judge's ex-ante payo¤; i.e., Corollary 2 need not hold, as this argument relies on the fact that the expert's revelation set is locally insensitive and y is at its boundary. However, as the experts'payment p becomes arbitrarily small, the outcome converges to the outcome without payments. Therefore, the qualitative features of the equilibrium in our initial model continues to hold even if a su¢ ciently small yet positive payment is o¤ered for information revelation.
Conclusion
Reliance on the experts'advice is a common practice in a variety of decision-making processes. The decision-maker herself may lack the expertise to …nd or analyze the relevant information needed for e¤ective decision-making and may rely on the experts' opinion to reach a conclusion. But experts can be biased. They may have their personal agenda and manipulate the information they provide to the decision-maker so as to induce her to take an action that better serves their own self-interests rather than facilitating e¢ cient decision-making. However, in many such environments there are also constraints on an expert's ability to manipulate his report. Once revealed, often the expert's report can be veri…ed, and concerns for reputation or threat of penalty for fabrication of evidence (or both) may act as a deterrent for information manipulation. Moreover, the presence of competing experts with potentially opposed self-interests may undo each others'attempt to conceal unfavorable information.
We consider such a "persuasion game" where two experts with potentially con ‡icting agenda attempt to persuade a decision-maker, or a "judge", to take a favorable action and ask the following question: how does the extent of con ‡ict between the experts a¤ect the quality of decision-making (as re ‡ected by the payo¤ of the judge)? We focus on two di¤erent measures of con ‡ict: (i) how diverse the agenda of the two experts are and (ii) the quality of the opposing experts as re ‡ected by the prior likelihood of an expert being informed.
We highlight three key results. First, we argue that employing experts of better quality need not result in better decision making. When the experts'have moderate agenda, an increase in an expert's quality can reduce the judge's payo¤ ex ante. This …nding runs contrary to the intuitive argument that having better quality experts should always lead to better decision-making. Second, if the judge could choose the two experts based on their own agenda, it is always optimal to engage experts whose agenda are either completely opposed or completely align but extreme. And third, it may be optimal to employ two experts with the same extreme agenda rather than two experts with completely opposed agenda. This …nding, again, runs contrary to the common intuition that con ‡icting experts always reveal more information.
Note that our …ndings are based on two key assumptions: (i) both experts, if informed, observe the same information about the state, and (ii) conditional on being the "informed" type, the information acquisition by an expert is automatic-that is, the expert does not have to incur any cost or exert any e¤ort to observe the state. The latter assumption rules out any moral hazard issue in the persuasion game. While the key economic e¤ects that we highlight in this article continue to hold even if we relax these assumptions, to what extent our key …ndings are robust to these assumptions remains an interesting area for future research.
Proof of Corollary 1. The revelation sets i follows directly from its characterization as given in Proposition 1. Also, equation (2) is simply the …rst-order condition associated with the maximization problem given in Proposition 1 that y is a solution to. The …rst-order condition is both necessary and su¢ cient to characterize y since the assumption that u 00 < 0 implies that the second-order condition is always satis…ed. Thus, it only remains to show that in equilibrium, y 2 (0; 1).
Suppose that the revelation sets of the two experts are 0 and 1 respectively. Now, the judge's payo¤ from any default action y is
(Here we use the fact that for any set E , f ( jE) = f ( ) = Pr (E) :) Taking derivative with respect to y and setting y = 0; we have
Due to strict single peakedness, u 0 J (0; 0) = 0 and u 0 J (0; ) < 0 for > 0: Since f ( ) is assumed to have full support, f ( ) k; for some …nite k > 0. So, we can write
is strictly greater than a positive number. Therefore, the best response of the judge is always an interior action. (ii) If x 0 = x 1 = 0, then 0 = 1 = [0; y ]; the default action y = y 00 solves:
; the default action y = y 11 solves:
The only additional claim that needs to be proved is that the equilibrium is unique. We present the proof for the case of opposed experts (x 0 = 0 and x 1 = 1). To see this, denote:
Note that Z is continuous,
So, by Mean Value Theorem, there exists a value of y 2 (0; 1) such that Z (y) = 0: Moreover, this value must be unique since Z 0 (y) < 0. This observation completes the proof. The cases for similar experts are analogous.
Proof of Proposition 3 and Corollary 2. We …rst prove the proposition and its corollary for con ‡ict equilibria and then the same for (partially) congruent equilibria.
Step 1. Consider a con ‡ict equilibrium, i.e., x 0 < y < x 1 . The revelation set for A 0 is [l 0 ; y ] where l 0 = maxf2x 0 y ; 0g: Similarly, the revelation set for A 1 is [y ; h 1 ] where h 1 = minf2x 1 y ; 1g: Now, we have
Taking derivative with respect to 0 ; we obtain
Using the …rst-order condition and the fact that u J (x; x) = 0; we have
Step 2. If a con ‡ict equilibrium is locally insensitive, i.e. if x 0 < y =2 and x 1 > (1 + y ) =2, then l 0 = 0 and h 1 = 1: In that case,
This proves Proposition 3 for the case of con ‡ict equilibrium. If x 0 = 0 and x 1 = 1; the equilibrium is unique by Proposition 1, and since y 2 (0; 1); we must have x 0 < y =2 and x 1 > (1 + y ) =2. Thus, the unique equilibrium is locally insensitive, and we must have
This proves Corollary 2 for the case of x 0 = 0 and x 1 = 1.
Step 3. Next, consider a (partially) congruent equilibrium. We consider only the case where x 0 x 1 y : (The other case, where y x 0 is similar.) The revelation set for A i is [l 0 ; y ] where l i = maxf2x i y ; 0g; i = 1; 2: Moreover, since x 0 x 1 ; we must have l 0 l 1 . Now, we have
) dF: Taking derivative with respect to 0 ; we obtain:
Again, by using the …rst-order condition and the fact that u J (x; x) = 0; we have
Step 4. If such a con ‡ict equilibrium is locally insensitive, i.e., if x 1 < y =2, then l 0 = l 1 = 0: In that case,
= 0: Therefore, for locally insensitive congruent equilibria, we have:
This proves Proposition 3 for the case of congruent equilibrium. If x 0 = x 1 = 0; the equilibrium is unique by Proposition 1, and since y 2 (0; 1); the unique equilibrium is locally insensitive implying that 
Suppose the judge commits to a default actionŷ. Soŷ must solve:
The …rst-order condition is:
But this is the same condition as in equation (5) . Hence the judge's choice of the default action (under commitment power) coincides with her default action in the original game. Hence, the payo¤s are also identical in the two case. In other words, commitment power has no value to the judge in this case. We can similarly prove the cases for extreme and identical experts, i.e. By Proposition 4, u J (0; 0); u J (1; 1) and u J (0; 1) are the same under commitment or in absence of commitment. To prove the above inequality, we proceed along the following steps.
Step 1: We argue that for any equilibrium with 
We have already noted in the proof of Proposition 4, u J (0; 1) = max
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the utilities are all non-positive, and (1 i ) 2 (0; 1] for i = 1; 2:
Step 2: Next, we argue that for any equilibrium with x 0 x 1 < y ; u J (x 0 ; x 1 ) u J (0; 0) (and similarly, for any equilibrium with x 1 > x 0 > y ; we have u J (x 0 ; x 1 ) u J (1; 1)). Suppose x 0 x 1 < y : Now, the revelation sets of the two experts are [l 0 ; y ] and [l 1 ; y ] respectively, where l 0 2 [0; y ] and l 1 2 [l 0 ; y ]: Now,
We have already noted in the proof of Proposition 4 that u J (0; 0) = max
u J (y ; )dF + R 1 y u J (y ; )dF = u J (x 0 ; x 1 ); where the last inequality follows from the fact that the utilities are all non-positive, and (1 i ) 2 (0; 1] for i = 1; 2:
By the same logic, we can show that if y < x 0 x 1 ; then u J (1; 1) u J (x 0 ; x 1 ): Therefore, we obtain that max Lastly, note that whenever experts are su¢ ciently opposed, there is an equilibrium where the outcome is the same as that of the pro…le f0; 1g independent of whether commitment is allowed or not. Similarly, for su¢ ciently similar but extreme experts, we have an equilibrium where the outcome is the same as that of completely identical but extreme experts. Hence the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6. When the experts are opposed, by equation ( It is routine the check that the judge's payo¤ is the same as u 00 J even if x 0 = x 1 = 1. Now, since for any 0 and 1 ,
we have u 00 J > u 01 J . Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that in an equilibrium, the revelation set of the experts is [a; b] with 0 a b 1; and the best response of the judge is y (trivially, both experts have identical revelation sets). Using Corollary 1, one obtains that in any equilibrium, y must satisfy the following condition:
Now, in any equilibrium of this game (i) either a = y and b = minf1; 2x y g or (ii) b = y and a = maxf0; 2x y g. Thus, in order to obtain the complete characterization of the set of equilibria, we need to check under what conditions (if any), each of the above types of equilibrium is consistent with equation (A2). Case 1: a = 0; b = y This equilibrium exists whenever x y =2: Equation (A2) would imply y 2 2y + 1 = 0. The only solution to this equation that is less than 1 is:
Therefore, whenever x 1=2(1 + p 1 ); there is an equilibrium where the judge's decision is 1=(1 + p 1 ). Case 2: a = y ; b = 1: This does not apply here, since we have x 1=2. Case 3: a = y < b = 2x y : Equation (A2) would imply y+2 (x y) 2 = 1=2. Let y = x u: Then, we can rewrite this as a quadratic in u: 2 u 2 u + (x 1=2) = 0. Notice that since 0 < y < x; we must have the solution u 2 (0; x): The only positive solution to the above equation is:
The constraint u + < x implies p 1 + 8 (1=2 x) < 4 x 1, which requires 4 x 1 > 1, i.e. x > 1 2 > 1 2 ; which is a contradiction. Therefore, there cannot be any equilibrium in case 3. Case 4. a = 2x y b = y: Equation (A2) would imply y 2 (y x) 2 = 1=2. Let y x = t: Then, we can rewrite this as the following quadratic in t : 2 t 2 t + (1=2 x) = 0 which gives two solutions t + and t ; where For feasibility, we need y 0, i.e. t x and 2x y 1, i.e. t 1 x: Since x 1 2 ; t x ) t 1 x: We also need t 0: First, for t to be real, we need x 1 2 1 8 : Notice that as long as this condition is true we have 0 p 1 8 (1=2 x) 1; and thus both t + and t are weakly positive. Case 4.1. We …rst look into the root t + . We need t + x; i.e., p 1 8 (1=2 x) 4 x 1;
for which, a necessary condition is x Proof. The proof is given in the following two steps:
Step 1: First, note that given the strategies speci…ed in Proposition 1, the speci…ed beliefs are trivially consistent on the equilibrium path. If at least one expert reports the true , say , = 1 for = and 0 otherwise.
Step 2: Next we need to show that the proposed strategies are mutual best-responses given the belief . Consider the strategy of an expert A i . Given the strategies of the judge and all rival experts, expert A i 's action a¤ects his payo¤ only if all other experts fail to reveal the state (i.e., A j = for all j 6 = i). But if A j = and A i reports a set S i such that 2 S i , then given the belief of the judge, her action is^ = arg min 2S i u i ( ; x i ). So, u i (^ ; x i ) u i ( ; x i ) : Hence, it is never a (strictly) best-response for A i to report S i . Thus, without loss of generality, the game boils down to the persuasion game with restricted strategy space for the experts where m i 2 f ;;g. Now, the proof follows directly from Proposition 1.
Note that under the strategy pro…le hy (m) ; m i ( )i ; S(M) is either (fully informative report pro…le) or (fully uninformative report pro…le) and any partially informative report pro…le may arise only o¤ the equilibrium path. The PBE given in Proposition 1 is supported by the following o¤-equilibrium belief of the judge: if she observes only one expert, say A i , reporting a set M i that contains multiple states but not the entire state space, she believes that the state is actually the one in S(M) which is worst from the point of view of the expert A i : Under such a belief, conditional on being pivotal (when all other experts send uninformative reports), partial obfuscation through reporting a subset of the state space is always weakly worse than reporting the state itself. Thus, Proposition 8 shows that there is limited loss of generality in considering a restricted strategy space, and we maintain this simpler formulation as it considerably improves the analytical tractability of our model.
